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before the North Korean Invasion

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. During 1949 and 1950, barter for military supplies* was carried on between North Korea and the USSR on the following terms:

- a. Six months' labor in the USSR from 50 North Koreans was exchanged for one Soviet tank. A large (undetermined) number of Soviet tanks of unidentified types was given the North Korean government on this basis; the tanks were kept in Manchuria until 1 week before the North Korean invasion, then moved across the border into Korea.
- b. Four hundred sacks (approximately eight large tu per sack)** were exchanged for one airplane (type not specified).
- c. Five sacks of refined rice were exchanged for one PPSH.

2. From 17 March 1949, the conclusion of the economic and cultural pact between North Korea and the USSR, Soviet ships frequently visited North Korean east coast ports. After April 1950, the traffic became particularly heavy, with both merchant vessels and warships entering North Korean harbors almost daily. Machinery and clothing were discharged from merchant craft. Military supplies were handled exclusively by the army and were mostly unloaded at night, so that only such easily distinguishable items as heavy guns could be recognized by civilian observers.

3. Much military cargo was unloaded at Wonsan and distributed by rail over the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Some also came through Yonchon (127-04, 38-06), from which distribution was made along the 38th Parallel defense lines by mobilizing all the horse and ox-carts available in South Hamgyong and Kangwon Provinces, in addition to army transport.

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4. In early May 1950, it was known to the families of some higher echelon North Korean officials that the North Korean cabinet had decided to unify Korea before 15 August. Responsibility for the attack was assigned to the Fatherland Unification Democratic Front, which was to issue to South Korean political parties and organizations an appeal for unification containing certain points impossible for the Republic of Korea (ROK) government to accept. The anticipated ROK refusal of the appeal was to be the pretext for North Korean military action.
5. The actual military campaign was to be led by General CH'OE Yong-kŏn, General KANG Kun, and PAK Il-u, Minister of Internal Affairs, who took an oath that the military action would be successful. If the effort had not succeeded by 15 August, PAK Hŏn-yŏng was, through members of the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP), to bring about the collapse of the ROK. The main effort was to be directed toward Seoul, with plans for the SKLP to take over all agencies as the government disintegrated.
6. About 15 June 1950, CHU Nyong-ha, North Korean Ambassador to the USSR, returned to Pyongyang for secret conferences with North Korean government leaders, including KIM Il-sŏng, PAK Hŏn-yŏng, HO Ka-i and CHONG Chun-t'aek ***, as well as with Soviet Ambassador Shtykov. CHU returned to Moscow in early July.

* Comment. Previous indications that Soviet military supplies shipped to North Korea were paid for in terms of food have not stated so specifically the exact barter ratio.

** Comment. Presumably the sacks contained rice.

*** Comment. CHONG, a native of North Hamgyong, age about 40, was not active in Communist affairs before World War II. After 1945 he became chairman of the National Planning Committee, and, as a favorite and confidential adviser of KIM Il-sŏng, was rising rapidly in importance in North Korean Communist circles.

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